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Data from the U.S. Census Bureau are used to test the relationship of local social 
services, public safety, and education expenditures, all as proportions of total 
local expenditures aggregated to the state level, with the property and crime rates 
for years 2007 through 2010.  Previous literature and theory suggest that any 
significant relationships to crime would be inverse relationships.  The initial 
results of this study indicate an unexpected significant positive relationship 
between the proportion of social services expenditures and the violent crime rate 
for years 2007 through 2010.  The results also indicate a significant inverse 
relationship between proportion of public safety expenditures and the violent 
crime rate, but not for all years tested.  Results should be viewed in the context of 
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Chapter I.  Introduction 
 Politics, criminal justice decisions and incarceration rates intertwine throughout 
history and can have far-reaching effects.  For instance, violent crime and property crime 
consistently declined beginning in the mid 1990’s (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Key Facts 
at a Glance: Property Crime Rates & Violent Crime Rates).  Though crime rates 
decreased, incarceration rates skyrocketed (Center for Economic and Policy Research, 
2010).  The increase in incarceration and high corrections expenditures despite the 
corresponding decreases in violent and property crime is often attributed to past and 
current policy.  One question to consider is whether or not the crime rate would have 
fallen more if investments were made in social services rather than incarceration.   
 The current economic crisis presents an opportunity for policy makers to create 
criminal justice policies that are cost effective, lower incarceration rates and reduce 
crime.   Resources are scare, and tough decisions are made at all levels of government in 
regards to where to invest funds.  Officials need to know if the vast amount of money 
invested in public safety, education and social services are associated with decreases in 
crime rates.  Much is known about how state and federal political decisions throughout 
history affected incarceration and crime rates.  Much less is known about how policy 
decisions regarding investments in public safety, education and social services at the 
local level affect crime.  For instance, are investment decisions affecting crime- reduction 




 The following study aims to add to the literature by addressing the gap in research 
in regard to budget decisions and the effects those have on crime rates.  The information 
contained in this study will add to the literature on the topic by testing the connections 
between political resource investments and crime.  It will test whether local investments 
aggregated at the state level in social services, public safety and education are associated 
with any decreases in crime, and will test if one investment has more of an effect on 
crime than the other.  This study will also consider whether or not there are any lag 
effects regarding investments and the crime rates.  Answering these questions can 
perhaps provide some guidance for policy makers in regards to the investment decisions 
of scarce resources.  This thesis will explore if the following hypotheses are true: 
H1:  As social services expenditures increase (as a proportion of total expenditures), 
the violent and property crime rates decrease.   
H2:  As public safety expenditures increase (as a proportion of total expenditures), the 
violent and property crime rates decrease.   
H3:  As education expenditures increase (as a proportion of total expenditures), the 
violent and property crime rates decrease.   
H4:  Investments in social services (as a proportion of total expenditures), will have 
the  largest inverse relationship with crime rates than public safety and education 
expenditures (all as proportions of total expenditures) 
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H5:  The effects of the investments in social services, public safety, or education (all 
as proportions of total expenditures) on violent/ property crime rates will increase 
over time. 
 These hypotheses will be answered using data from the Census Bureau and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Specifically, the independent variable data are from the 
2007 Census of Governments: Finance, Table 2, Local Government Finances by Type of 
Government and State: 2006 – 2007.  Data for the dependent variables are from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 Uniform Crime Reports, 













Chapter II.  Criminal Justice Policy and Practice 
 Many of the investment decisions that affect states and localities are as a result of 
federal concern with crime that began almost 60 years ago.  To that effect, it is important 
to understand the context in which state and local criminal justice investment decisions 
are being made and influenced by, and how investment decisions are not usually mutually 
exclusive to each level of government.   
Brief History of the Crime Debate 
 Although it is difficult to have a direct impact on state or local crime rates through 
federal policy, there has been an attempt to affect crime rates through Federal legislation 
throughout the years.  To understand the impacts of investments on crime rates, it is 
important to understand the political landscape in which decisions were made that bring 
us to the point where we are today. 
 Over the past 60 years the federal government increased its interest and role in 
crime control.  While rehabilitative strategies that addressed social inequities were largely 
supported, a move towards more punitive crime control became a pervasive strategy for 
the federal government.  The crime debate began to take place on the federal stage in the 
1960s in response to the many social challenges of the decade.  Politicians began to talk 
about crime as a national issue that the federal government should be involved in, and 
became highly politicized (Lipsey & Cullen, 2007).  This was aided by Ronald Reagan’s 
exaggerated tale of welfare fraud in which he coined the term “Welfare Queen” that 
received national attention and added to the debate regarding social services and crime 
(Krugman, 2007).  Social movements such as civil rights and welfare rights pressured 
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politicians to consider the link between poverty, race and crime, and to act to combat 
crime (Walker, 1998).  Some politicians saw these movements as examples of a rising 
need for the federal government to take a larger role in maintaining social control, rather 
than providing social support to reduce the amount of social inequity in the country 
(Beckett, 1997).   President Johnson initiated both the Law Enforcement Assistance Act 
of 1965 and the Safe Streets Bill in 1967.  This legislation exemplified the rising change 
in opinion on how best to address crime.  The legislation supported law enforcement, 
rather than addressing structural and social conditions which in the past had typically 
been the preferred emphasis of government programs by non-conservatives (Zimring, 
2007).   
 Due to Martinson’s (1974) report that was interpreted as “nothing works” in 
regards to rehabilitating offenders, both conservative and liberal leaders began to support 
a clear move away from rehabilitative strategies.  Approaches that move away from 
rehabilitative strategies enjoyed support from all sides; liberal politicians viewed these 
policies as not adequately addressing social inequities, while conservatives used this to 
even further their views of rehabilitative strategies as too weak on accounting for public 
safety concerns.   
 Conservatives in particular began to further their views that crime in part is a 
result of a dependence on welfare and other social programs (Simon, 2007).  This view 
included a shift in thinking about the typical offender.  Instead of once being seen as a 
victim of the neglect of society, the typical offender was now being viewed as a person 
who chooses to commit crimes and therefore deserves a harsh response (Ruth & Reitz, 
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2003).  As the crime debate focused on issues of drug addiction and street crime, the 
debate increasingly focused on the poor and people of color.  Poverty became 
criminalized, in a sense; many conservatives saw the drug problems and street crime that 
typically affected poorer communities as widespread personal failings.  Crime was seen 
as a result of personal immorality rooted in individual choices as opposed to social 
conditions (Ruth & Reitz, 2003).  This viewpoint was used as an attempt to justify 
reductions in welfare spending and to encourage the adoption of policies that support 
social control instead of social welfare (Beckett, 1997). 
 Public concern over crime grew, coupled with doubts that government was well- 
equipped to handle complex social issues (Zimring, 2007).  Federal and state policy 
shifted away from social welfare and towards social control.  Policies that use 
incapacitation to enhance public safety and deterrence became a main priority (Walker, 
1998). 
 At the Federal level, there were several pieces of legislation signed into law that 
exemplified the moves away from rehabilitative policies and represented the increasing 
role the Federal government took with regard to public safety.  In 1986, President Reagan 
signed the Anti- Drug Abuse Act into law.  This legislation and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines of 1984 included harsh mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug 
offenses (Beckett & Sasson, 2004).  Along with a shift in ideology and strategy came a 
shift in investments.  Between 1980 and 1991, federal agencies responsible for drug 
treatment, prevention and education were reduced drastically while funding for law 
enforcement increased.  By 1985, only 22 percent of funds allocated to the drug problem 
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went to drug treatment and prevention, while 78 percent went to law enforcement 
(Beckett, 1997).  Funding for agencies that directly targeted drugs increased as well.  
Between 1980 and 1984, FBI antidrug funds increased from $8 million to $95 million.  
During this same time period, the budget for the Drug Enforcement Agency increased as 
well, from $215 million to $321 million (Beckett, 1997).  The federal government also 
created grant programs to give money directly to localities to increase their law 
enforcement capacity; one of the best known of these grant programs is Community 
Oriented Policing Services (COPS).  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
reviewed the effectiveness of the COPS program in increasing law enforcement capacity 
and decreasing crime.  In 2005, a GAO report found that between 1994 and 2001, COPS 
grant expenditures accounted for an increase of approximately 3 percent.  In roughly this 
same time period, the report found that the COPS grant funds contributed to a 1.3 percent 
decline in the overall crime rate and a 2.3 percent decline in the violent crime rate 
(Government Accountability Office, 2005). 
 The 1994 Crime Bill also added funds to punitive measures.  Funds were made 
available to increase police forces and build additional prisons, but the funds were offered 
based on conditions.  Money for state prison construction was dependent on states 
implementing “truth-in sentencing” policies, which required offenders to serve a larger 
portion of their sentences. In order to gain access to these funds, by 1994, 30 states had 
adopted these policies and the “three strikes” laws (Beckett, 1997).  This bill marked an 
increase in federal spending and represented the larger role the federal government 
wanted to play in public safety.  The original cost estimate of the bill was $5.9 billion; the 
final estimated cost was $30.2 billion (Beckett & Sasson, 2004).  While the federal 
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government increased its investment in social control, it decreased its spending on social 
welfare programs.    
 These same frames continue to shape the debate over criminal justice practices, 
policies, programs and investments to date; “get tough” approaches to crime rise in 
popularity if crime is depicted as a result of criminal justice system leniency.  
Alternatively, viewpoints shaped by the idea that crime is a result of poverty and other 
social woes will lead to investments and policies that address these factors.  For example, 
to the extent that crime is seen as a consequence of lenience within the criminal justice 
system, policies that get tough with criminal offenders seem most appropriate.  When 
crime is depicted as a consequence of poverty, unemployment, or inequality, it suggests 
the need for policies that address these social and economic conditions (Beckett & 
Sasson, 2004). 
 The view that crime has social causes and that some rehabilitative programs are 
effective has expansive academic support (Beckett, 1997).  Despite this support, debates 
over criminal justice policies are less influenced by research than by political discourse 
(Beckett & Sasson, 2004).  Political emphasis on certain approaches to crime is not a 
reaction to public concern and outcry over crime.  These policies are most often driven 
from the top down:  
Levels of public concern about crime and drug use are not consistently associated 
with the reported incidence of these social problems.  Popular attitudes about 
crime and drugs have been shaped to an important extent by the definitional 
activities of political elites.  These actors have drawn attention to crime and drug 





 The history of the political landscape regarding criminal justice decisions and 
emphases on investments in rehabilitative vs. punitive strategies throughout the years 
directly informs the current thesis.  The criminal justice investment decisions today are 
often influenced by history and by politics, as decisions made at all levels of government 
are influenced by each other.  The following section addresses the results of the decisions 
that have been made politically regarding strategies chosen for investing in criminal 
justice, and the result of the culmination of those decisions.   
The Result of Investments in Crime 
Just because crime rates decline does not mean that government actions create 
significant crime reductions (Zimring, 2007). 
 
 Most information regarding political decisions and the resulting criminal justice 
investments and outcomes come from the federal and state level.  There are many reasons 
and aims for making investments in public safety, education and social services.  One 
possible outcome of these investments, among many, is a reduction in crime.  The 
purpose of this thesis is not to explore why certain policies are chosen as investments in 
public safety, education or social services, but rather what the results of those 
investments mean for crime rates.  This thesis will explore if investments in social 
services, education or public safety are associated with reductions in crime.   
 It is important to note the population, incarceration rate and violent and property 
crime rate trends over the past 50 years.  Over the past 50 years, the violent crime and 
property crime rates increased until around 1992, then started to decline; during this same 
period, the population of the United States steadily increased, while the incarceration rate 
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increased exponentially (Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2010).  Even though 
the population rates have increased slightly, and property and violent crime rates started 
declining around 1992, the incarceration rate continued to skyrocket.  This suggests that 
only a small part of the increase in incarceration can be explained by rising crime (Center 
for Economic and Policy Research, 2010).   
 Current estimates state that one out of every one-hundred adults is incarcerated in 
jail or prison in the United States (The PEW Center on the States, 2009).  Additionally, 
one out of every thirty-one adults is involved in the corrections system through 
incarceration or some form of supervision (The PEW Center on the States, 2008).  These 
figures are aggregate numbers, and do not capture how incarceration disproportionately 
affects minorities.  While 1 in 106 white men ages 18 and over is incarcerated, 1 in 36 
Hispanic men 18 and older is incarcerated, and 1 in 15 Black men over 18 is incarcerated 
(The PEW Center on the States, 2008).  Most shocking, 1 in 9 Black men ages 20 – 34 is 
incarcerated (The PEW Center on the States).   Minority women are also 
disproportionately incarcerated.  While 1 out of 355 white women ages 35 to 39 is 
incarcerated, 1 in 297 Hispanic women and 1 in 100 Black women in the same age group 
is incarcerated (The PEW Center on the States, 2008).    
 The expansion of the criminal justice system is a result of decades of “get tough” 
policies and investments in strategies associated with deterrence and incapacitation 
theory.  The policies that have contributed to the increase in incarceration include three- 
strikes laws, mandatory sentencing, laws that target non-violent offenders and low-level 
drug offenders.  Policies that target drug crimes for additional incarceration time have 
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greatly contributed to the increase in prison and jail rates.  As a result of targeting drug 
offenders, many prisons and jails house lots of people whose most serious crime is the 
possession or the sale of drugs (Beckett & Sasson, 2004).  During the War on Drugs 
between 1979 and 1994, the percentage of state inmates convicted of nonviolent drug 
offenses increased from 6 percent to almost 30 percent.  During this same time period, 
the percentage of federal inmates convicted of nonviolent drug crimes increased from 21 
percent to 60 percent (Beckett, 1997).   
 The increase in incarceration naturally led to an increase in corrections 
expenditures.  Between 1965 and 1993, crime control expenditures increased from $4.6 
billion to $100 billion, and from .6 percent to 1.57 percent of the gross domestic product- 
an increase of 166 percent (Beckett, 1997).  Local justice expenditures alone increased by 
422 percent from 1982 to 2006 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Key Facts at a Glance: 
Direct Expenditure by Level of Government, 1982- 2006). 
 The expansion of prisons and jails and criminal expenditures is not a result of a 
worsening crime problem (Beckett & Sasson, 2004).  As was mentioned previously, the 
increase in incarceration and crime expenditures is estimated to be a result of policies 
associated with crime control and punitiveness.  Although federal, state and local policies 
have moved to be more punitive in nature, there is still a lot of support for investing in 
social programs to increase public safety and decrease crime rates.   
 Throughout history, federal, state, and local governments have spent vast amounts 
of money for the purpose of reducing crime.  Some strategies have been more 
rehabilitative, while others have been more punitive, but as demonstrated, these decisions 
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have far- reaching effects and implications.  Despite all of these investments and although 
crime has continued to drop, there are still debates as to what approach is best.   
 There are several competing theories that have developed and manifested in 
investments in rehabilitative or punitive strategies that continue today.  These theories, 
and research regarding their efficacy, can help parse out what investment decisions may 
reduce crime and which may not affect, or even increase, crime.   Understanding which 
theories have guided policies, practice and investments and their effect on crime rates is 
vital for guiding the hypotheses of the current study.  During these tough economic times, 
it is more important than ever to ensure smart and effective criminal justice investments 
that increase public safety.  These theories also help inform what the results of the current 
study may be and assist with interpreting results and putting them in perspective.   
 Institutional anomie and deterrence are two theories that can inform criminal 
justice policy and practice for the purposes of reducing crime.  Although strategies for 
crime reduction are aspects the theories can help inform, their reasoning for reaching 
crime reduction differ vastly between the two theories.   
 Decisions on investments at the federal, state and local levels are consistent with 
these theories.  It is important to look at the impact these investments have had on 
budgets and crime rates in order to discuss which strategies work best for reducing crime 





Chapter III.  Deterrence 
Today, I ask every Governor, every mayor, and every county and city 
commissioner and councilman to examine the adequacy of their state and local 
law enforcement systems and to move promptly to support the policemen, the law 
enforcement officers, and the men who wage the war on crime day after day in all 
the streets and roads and alleys in America (Simon, 2007). 
     -  President Lyndon Johnson 
 
 Deterrence theory is based mostly on classical criminological theory, which states 
that individuals choose to commit crimes.  They engage in a rational decision- making 
process where they weigh the costs and benefits of pursuing their own interests and 
pleasures through criminal activity, and then decide to do so based upon the weighing of 
those costs and benefits (Cullen & Agnew, 2006).  Therefore, if it is to someone’s 
advantage to commit crime, they will do so.  The best way to deter someone from 
committing crimes is to increase the cost of crime and decrease the benefits.  Increasing 
the cost of crime can be accomplished through punishments that are swift, certain, and 
severe (Cullen & Agnew, 2006).  By increasing the cost of crime, specific and general 
deterrence are thought to be accomplished.  Specific deterrence is when the costs of 
committing crime will prevent people who have been punished from committing 
additional crimes (Paternoster, 2010).  This can be accomplished through actual 
imprisonment, during which people who are incarcerated are unable to commit additional 
crimes, or through being swayed from committing additional crimes because of the 
punishment experienced.  General deterrence is based upon dissuading people who have 
not yet offended from committing crimes by the fear of sanction threats (Paternoster, 
2010).     
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 Implications of deterrence theory are often viewed through incarceration and 
police.  By investing to increase the number of police or employing policing strategies 
that target certain areas, it may increase the certainty of getting caught.  Deterrence 
theory in part posits that if the certainty of getting caught increases, then people may be 
dissuaded from committing crime.  Utilizing incarceration, on the other hand, might be 
viewed as a severe punishment that can deter people from committing crimes.  Expanding 
the reach of incarceration can also be seen as increasing both specific and general 
deterrence.  As such it is important to look at deterrence theory through the results of 
investments that have been made in incarceration and police.   
Incarceration 
 In the 1970s and 1980s there was a huge shift in resources and strategies reflected 
in state budgets nationwide.  Between 1976 and 1989, state budgets allocated to 
education decreased by 12 percent, and allocations to welfare programs declined by 41 
percent, thereby decreasing funding for institutions that if strengthened might have a 
mitigating effect on the dominant economic institution.  During roughly this same time 
period, average monthly welfare benefits shrank from $714 to $394.  Investments in more 
correctional- focused expenditures increased during this time period.  Between 1976 and 
1989, state correctional expenditures increased by 95 percent (Beckett, 1997).  In the past 
twenty years, the states’ budget category of corrections has grown at a faster rate than 
every other spending category with the exception of Medicaid (The PEW Center on the 
States, 2010).  In total, state spending on corrections increased 333 percent from 1988 to 
2008 (National Association of State Budget Officers, 2009).  On average, corrections is 
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the fifth- largest state budget category (The PEW Center on the States, 2008).  Increases 
in state budgets for corrections may have affected levels of incarceration.  Research 
suggests that increases in state resources to build additional prison beds accounts for 
approximately 30 percent of the increase in incarceration rates over the past 30 years 
(Spelman, 2009). 
 California also demonstrates states’ shifting resources from rehabilitative 
strategies and social support investments to corrections- focused investments that might 
increase deterrence and therefore might decrease crime.  In California, state spending on 
higher education decreased by about $1 billion between 1985 and 2000.  Spending on 
corrections increased by around $3 billion during the same time period (American 
Society of Criminology, 2001).  
 However, while investments in punitive strategies were increasing, the crime rate 
decreased during the 1990s.  Although an increase in imprisonment rates did have some 
impact on declining crime rates in the 1990s, most research has concluded that it was not 
the only contributing factor, and likely was not the most important factor (Vold, Bernard, 
and Snipes, 2002).  Researchers attribute anywhere from 10 percent to 27 percent of the 
drop in the crime rates to the effect of increased incarceration (Zimring, 2007; Western, 
2006).  Paternoster (2010) notes that the literature mostly supports that the 90’s crime 
drop may be attributable to an increase in imprisonment as well as longer sentences.  
However, Paternoster also notes that it is difficult to determine how much of the crime 
reduction is a result of imprisonment and incapacitation and how much a result of 
deterrence (Paternoster, 2010).  Some research indicates that the deterrent effects of 
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imprisonment differ according to the type of offender sentenced.  For example, 
imprisoning drug offenders did not have an effect on reducing crime, but incarcerating 
violent offenders did (Cohen & Canela- Cacho, 1994). 
 There is some research support that says increasing incarceration by 10 percent 
will achieve a two to four percent reduction in crime (Vera Institute of Justice, 2007).  
Although incarceration may reduce some crime and therefore have a deterrent effect, it is 
often not clear when and how incarceration will reduce crime (Lynch & Sabol, 2000; 
Nagin, 1998).  The states of Texas and New York demonstrate this best.  Texas increased 
rates of incarceration by 144 percent and experienced a simultaneous decrease in crime of 
35 percent.  New York increased its incarceration rate by only 24 percent and 
experienced a crime reduction of 43 percent.  States nationwide experienced similar 
results; states that increased their state prison populations by an average of 13 percent 
experienced average crime reductions of 17 percent (Gainsborough & Mauer, 2000).  
Conversely, the largest drops in violent crime have been seen in states that have reduced 
incarceration rates (Justice Policy Institute, 2008). 
 Other research supports the idea that an increase in incarceration will reduce 
crime rates, but that this effect only exists up to a certain point.  Liedka, Piehl and Useem 
(2006), using state level prison and reported crime data, found that once the incarceration 
rate reaches a certain point, additional increases in incarceration are associated with an 
increase in crime.   
 Even if incarceration reduces crime rates, it may not be a fiscally viable option.  
While there may be a reduction in crime associated with increases in state prison 
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populations, most research indicates that the reduction is not significant compared to the 
additional resources necessary for the incarceration of more people.   Each state must 
analyze whether or not the cost of increasing incarcerated populations is worth the 
decrease in crime.  For instance: 
“California and Nebraska had very similar crime rates in 2003 of approximately 
4,000 index offenses per 100,000 people in the population. To achieve a 2 to 4 
percent reduction, California, with a prison population of 162,678 inmates, would 
have to incarcerate an additional 16,089 inmates.  To achieve the same rate of 
reduction, Nebraska, with a prison population of 3,976, would have to incarcerate 
just 400 additional inmates. If the average cost to incarcerate an offender for one 
year is $22,650, California would spend $355 million more than Nebraska to 
achieve the same level of public safety.  The cost incurred per unit of crime 
reduction, then, is substantially larger for California. Thus, an increase in 
incarceration in a state with an already large prison population may require a huge 
boost in actual prison populations that may be difficult to sustain economically 
(Vera Institute of Justice, 2007).” 
 
 
 Just like the federal and state prison levels, county jails have seen an increase in 
populations over the last few decades.  What effect have high incarceration rates had at 
the local level?  To begin with, more incarceration at the local level does not seem to 
indicate a lower crime rate.  A study of New York counties tested whether or not those 
counties with higher imprisonment rates for felony convictions resulting in prison 
sentences experienced lower crime rates.  Using trajectory modeling of county- level 
imprisonment, the authors found that counties that had heavier use of prison sentences 
actually experienced higher rates of violent crime, but not property crime (Schupp & 
Rivera, 2010).  The authors caution against any definitive statements from these results, 
as the sample size was small.  It does, however, lend some support to the idea that more 
incarceration does not definitely mean less crime.   
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 A second study, by Kovandzic and Vieraitis (2006), at the county level also 
looked at whether or not fluctuations in the number of county residents sentenced to state 
prison would affect the violent and property crime rates of the county.  The authors found 
that counties that relied most on imprisonment did not experience greater reductions in 
crime than those counties that relied less on imprisonment.   
Police 
 Over the last thirty years, localities’ corrections budgets have increased 
dramatically as the local incarceration rates increased.  Some estimates show that local 
corrections budgets have increased three times as fast as education (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2008).  Many of these corrections expenditures have gone towards local 
police.  The question is whether or not these investments in police, and therefore more 
deterrence- based punitive strategies, have affected crime rates.  One experiment 
considered this very question: the Kansas City Preventative Patrol experiment.  This 
experiment wanted to determine the various effects of policing on crime rates.  In order to 
test the effect, Kansas City was split up into three areas: one area received no 
preventative patrol, a second area increased police visibility, and a third area maintained 
the normal level of patrol.  An analysis of the data found interesting results.  The three 
areas experienced no significant differences in citizens’ attitudes toward police service, 
citizens’ fear of crime, police response time, or citizens’ satisfaction with police time.  
The most telling outcome was that there was no significant difference in the level of 
crime across the three areas (Kelling, 1974).  This study would indicate that investing in 
police to increase force size would not have a significant effect on crime.   
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 More recent analyses of the Kansas City experiment have cast major doubt on the 
efficacy of the outcomes of this study.  Many analysts who looked at this study more in 
depth after its release found that in actuality, there was most likely no difference in the 
amount of patrol presence in the three areas related to the experiment (Sherman, 2011).  
As there was no change in response to calls to service, patrol presence in the three areas 
was virtually left unchanged.  This means that no test was actually conducted if between 
the three areas there was not actually a difference in patrol visibility (Sherman, 2011).  
Ultimately, the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment’s conclusions are not deemed 
very dependable.   
 Alternatively, a number of studies have found that jurisdictions with more police 
officers actually have more crime (Vold et al., 2002).  As it is difficult to determine 
whether or not there are simply more police in high crime areas, it is difficult to 
determine a causal relationship.   
 There are aspects of deterrence theory that have garnered some more recent 
research support in regards to policing.  In terms of increasing deterrence by police 
presence, Cloninger (1994) found that police presence increases the risk of being 
punished for crimes.   Therefore, police presence in general may deter crime, especially 
violent crime.  A 2011 study cautiously lends support to the practice of foot patrol in 
driving down crime in violent crime hotspot areas.  Ratcliffe et al. (2011) found that 
violent crime hotspots that received 90 hours of Philadelphia, PA foot patrol officers for 
up to 90 hours per week experienced a reduction in violence of 90 offenses.  The authors 
caution that the crime reduction in the area may not solely be due to foot patrol officers 
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targeting hotspots, but to other factors as well.  Braga and Bond (2008) also conducted a 
randomized control trial to determine if focused policing strategies on areas of high crime 
could affect crime rates.  The results support specific policing strategies in crime hot 
spots to reduce crime, but the authors again caution on the generalizability of the results. 
 Paternoster (2010) also cautions on definitive statements regarding the effects of 
various policing strategies on crime.  One reason is because it is difficult to determine 
whether or not additional police matter more in decreasing crime, or if a decrease in 
crime is specifically attributable to a policing strategy (Paternoster, 2010).  Another 
reason is because it is difficult to tell whether or not specific policing strategies and the 
targeting of hot spots result in crime displacement, which is an increase in crime in areas 
surrounding the places targeted by specific policing strategies.  Recent research suggests 
that a more likely outcome of geographically targeted policing initiatives actually results 
in a ‘diffusion of benefit’ in the areas directly outside of the treatment area, suggesting 
that crime displacement may not be the typical outcome of policing strategies such as hot 
spots policing (Bowers, Johnson, Guerette, Summers & Poynton, 2011).    Short, 
Brantingham, Bertozzi and Tita (2010) also note that in empirical tests of hot spots 








 Research is mixed regarding the support for deterrence theory even though more 
recent research indicates that some deterrent- based strategies, such as incarceration and 
police, may reduce crime under certain circumstances.  Although there is some research 
support for deterrence theory, it is important not to over- generalize.  There is much that 
still needs to be discovered regarding when deterrence is most effective, how it is 















Chapter IV.  Institutional Anomie  
The get-tough policies that have resulted from this campaign are not supported by 
the findings of most sociological research, which suggest that severity of 
punishment does not have a significant deterrent effect and that welfare spending 
reduces rather than increases crime (Beckett & Sasson, 2004). 
 
 Strategies that most often support investing in social services to reduce crime can 
be formed in the context of institutional anomie theory.  Institutional anomie theory is a 
macro-level explanation of crime.  Although the theory was designed to explain 
“American exceptionalism” in the sense of accounting for America’s high rate of crime, 
particularly violent, predatory crime, it can be appealed to in the current account of why 
social welfare expenditures might be expected to be inversely related to crime. The focus 
of this theory is on the link between the central cultural components and major social 
institutions of which American society consist of, and observed crime patterns and rates 
(Rosenfeld & Messner, 2006).   
 Institutional anomie theory was born out of Merton’s anomie theory.  Merton’s 
theory supposed that the high crime rate in the United States could be explained through 
our cultural desire to achieve the American Dream, i.e. monetary success.  Merton 
hypothesized that there is a large emphasis on reaching monetary success in the United 
States, and that the goal of monetary success is more important than achieving it through 
legitimate means (Rosenfeld & Messner, 2006). This combined with the fact that 
America is also a class society with large segments of the population having limited 
access to legitimate mobility  routes like education and a good job, are said to account for 
the high rates of serious crime in America compared with other Western societies.  
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 Rosenfeld and Messner expanded Merton’s anomie theory by hypothesizing that 
while the culture that puts an emphasis on the American Dream may lead to crime, it 
does so because there are limited structural opportunities for people to utilize legitimate 
means to achieve success, i.e. money (Kubrin, Stucky, & Krohn, 2009). In addition to 
culture and social structure, however, they add the notion that crime can also be affected 
by the institutional arrangements in America.  That is, they argue that the crime 
producing effects of culture and structure can be mitigated by the effects of other social 
institutions, including parts of the welfare state.  The economy, polity, family, and 
education are all social institutions that play a role in regulating behavior by providing 
structural opportunities for people to achieve success through legitimate means.  The 
balance and interplay between these institutions is important for crime outcomes.  In an 
integrated and presumably healthy society, these institutions are in balance in the sense 
that while economic roles and the achieving of economic goals are important, the roles 
and goals of the other institutions are deemed of equal importance. For example, while 
earning an income is important, parents are not expected to spend all their time at work or 
working but are to fulfill their roles as parents since the family is important. Similarly, 
the importance of education is seen in its own right as the accumulation of knowledge 
and wisdom. In the United States, however, the economic institution dominates (in part as 
a reflection of the dominance of economic themes in the culture) and permeates the other 
institutions.  As such, the other non-economic institutions are devalued.  The parental role 
is devalued with respect to the “bread winner” role and parents are expected to spend 
long amounts of time at work even if it means missed soccer games, PTA meetings, or 
other family functions.  This devaluation of non-economic institutions means that their 
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abilities to regulate behavior are diminished, so social control is decreased and there is an 
increased likelihood of criminal activity (Kubrin et al, 2009).  At the cultural level, the 
American Dream emphasizes and encourages a breakdown of traditional social controls 
due to the prominence of the goal of monetary success (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001).  At 
the institutional level, the economy is dominant in the balance of power between all of 
the institutions which promotes weak social control (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001).  The 
American culture and the organization of American institutions are intertwined and foster 
one another, and lead to a greater likelihood of crime than in places where the 
institutional balance of power does not favor the economy so heavily. 
 In other societies, however, the economy does not dominate other institutions as 
much, in fact, in these societies other institutions such as the state via social welfare 
spending, intentionally attempt to tame the demands of the economy by providing 
assistance to those in need. They argued (2001: 106-107) that “governmental efforts to 
‘tame the market’ by providing guarantees of minimal levels of well-being are associated 
with comparatively low levels of serious crime.” The generosity of social-welfare states 
such as Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, for example, is argued to be one important 
reason for their lower rates of serious crime.  Messner and Rosenfeld (2001) concluded 
that “the mechanism through which material rewards are distributed in capitalist societies 
– specifically, the extent to which market forces are moderated and counterbalanced by 
the welfare state – thus appears to be related to overall levels of the most serious of 
crime, criminal homicide”. While Messner and Rosenfeld were making a point about 
cross-national differences in crime due to the moderating effect of welfare expenditures 
the argument by analogy can be made that lower-level jurisdictions, such as states and 
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counties, within the U.S. can lower their crime rates by moderating the anomic effect of 
the dominance of the economy and a market mentality by increasing their social welfare 
expenditures.  
 Although institutional anomie theory is a newer theory, there have been a few 
attempts to test it.  Tests of the theory have generally fallen into two categories: those that 
test the institutional dynamics portion of the theory, and those that test the cultural parts 
of the theory.  For the institutional dynamics portion of the theory, there have been 
several tests.   
 Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) argued that where there are larger social safety 
nets such as healthcare, child care and unemployment insurance, these larger social safety 
nets protect against unemployment and therefore the homicide rates should be lower.  
Other researchers set out to look at the efficacy of this interpretation of the theory.  
Hannon and DeFronzo (1998) looked at welfare assistance to see if crime rates were 
affected by counterbalancing the effect of economic scarcity on crime.  They looked at 
the effects through violent and property crime rates, using data from metropolitan areas.  
They interpreted their results as supportive of institutional anomie theory.  They found 
that the relationship between how large a disadvantaged population was and the crime 
rates was mitigated in areas with higher levels of welfare assistance.  In another test of 
social welfare policies and crime, Savolainen (2000) found that in countries with strong 
welfare states the economic disparity has less of an effect on homicide rates.   
 Pratt and Godsey (2003) also aimed to look at social welfare policies as a way to 
measure the efficacy of institutional anomie theory.  They measured the strength of social 
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welfare policies by the percentage of the nation’s gross domestic product spent on health 
care (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2006).  Pratt and Godsey (2003) found that social welfare 
policies mitigate the effect of income inequality on homicide rates.   
 Maume and Lee (2003) also found support for institutional anomie theory by 
looking at counties in the U.S.  Using measures of voter turnout, education and welfare 
expenditures, they found that noneconomic institutions can mitigate the criminogenic 
effects of a strong economic institution by reducing the effect of disparity on homicide 
rates. 
 It is important to note that in regards to the efficacy of the institutional part of 
institutional anomie theory that not all research results have been positive.  Jensen (2002) 
was not able to replicate an effect on homicide rates based on the generosity and 
extensiveness of social welfare policies.  Batton and Jensen (2002) too measured the 
effect of the generosity and extensiveness of social welfare policies on crime.  They used 
a time- series analysis of homicide rates between the years of 1900 and 1997.  This 
analysis produced mixed results: although they did find an effect of social welfare 
policies on homicide rates for the period of 1900 to 1945, they did not find any effects of 
social welfare policies on homicide rates for the period as a whole.  The authors 
concluded that their results could mean that social welfare policies may have an effect on 
homicide rates under certain institutional circumstances.   
 Although not directly testing institutional anomie theory, other studies have 
shown that the individual tenants related to the theory may enjoy some support.  There is 
evidence that this theoretical framework helps explain why investing in welfare can 
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actually decrease crime.  The thought is that crime is reduced by providing welfare relief, 
which affords a legitimate avenue for people to meet culturally defined goals (Burek, 
2005).  In addition, by providing welfare relief it may mitigate the pressure of the 
economic institution combined with culturally defined goals by lessening the effects of a 
dominant economic institution.  One study in particular found that higher welfare 
expenditures are associated with less crime (Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998).  Several studies 
suggest that it is not just simply investing in social support such as welfare that decreases 
crime, but the amount of money put into the programs.  For instance, higher levels of 
welfare assistance are also correlated with lower levels of crime (Hannon & DeFronzo, 
1998).  Cities with more generous welfare programs have been found to have lower 
levels of crime, including homicide (Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998).  This is not the only 
study to find a link between welfare assistance and reductions in serious crime.  In terms 
of serious offenses, several additional studies have found that as welfare relief increases, 
rates of serious offenses decrease (Burek, 2005).  Besides a decrease in crime, there may 
also be another unanticipated benefit from receiving welfare: a decrease in substance 
abuse (Brown, Montoya, Dayton- Shotts, Carroll- Curtis, & Riley, 2004).  These studies 
may lend support to institutional anomie theory through support of some of the research 
above that showed that places with more generous and extensive welfare programs 
helped mitigate economic factors that lead to high homicide rates.   
 While some researchers argue that there is an inverse relationship between 
welfare spending and crime, some suggest that there is no relationship at all (Worrall, 
2005).  Taking this idea a step further, it has also been suggested that social support such 
as welfare actually causes criminal behavior such as drug addiction and crime (Beckett, 
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1997).  Some claim that welfare programs in particular have significantly contributed to 
past rising crime rates (Beckett, 1997).  These studies can perhaps be seen as not lending 
support to institutional anomie theory.   
 Overall, the research for institutional anomie theory is limited at best.  According 
to Messner and Rosenfeld (2006) of the eleven studies that have tested the institutional 
dynamic portion of institutional anomie theory, seven are generally supportive, three are 
mixed and one did not find support for the theory.  In regards to testing the cultural 
dynamic portion of institutional anomie theory, the research is much more limited as well 
as less favorable (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2006).   
 There are several limitations to institutional anomie theory.  As it is a newer 
theory, there have only been a few tests of its efficacy.  In addition, it is a complex theory 
to test as it is difficult to decide what institutions to include, their relative strength and the 
interplay among them (Kubrin et al, 2009).  Many of the studies in support of 
institutional anomie used homicide rates, leaving some speculation as to the effect of 
institutional anomie on property crime rates.   
 Another limitation is in regards to how the key concepts and propositions of 
institutional anomie theory have been measured so far.  Even though the studies that have 
shown support for institutional anomie theory have used a variety of levels of units of 
analysis such as cities, metropolitan areas, counties, states, and nations, there is some 
debate as to whether these studies test the theory as intended originally (Kubrin et al, 
2009).  Although since the authors of institutional anomie theory themselves use 
examples at all levels of analyses to demonstrate initial positive results of the theory 
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(Messner & Rosenfeld, 2006), one might speculate that they do not take issue with testing 
institutional anomie on units of analysis at all levels, rather than just as tests between 
nations.  This suggests that studies at all levels are useful to include in a review of the 
support for institutional anomie theory.  The information as a whole puts the current 
study in context, while still recognizing that tests of institutional anomie theory that do 
not utilize the state as the unit of analysis may not be generalizable or applicable to the 
outcomes of the current study.  All in all, although there is some early support for 
institutional dynamics of institutional anomie theory there are questions that remain.  
 After reviewing the research, it appears as though research is mixed with respect 
to both institutional anomie theory and deterrence theory.  Deterrence theory does not 
generally enjoy overarching support.  However, more recent research suggests that 
deterrent strategies such as imprisonment and policing may lower crime under certain 
circumstances.  Institutional anomie theory enjoys some support, but much cannot be 
inferred at this time as this theory is new and the tests of it have been few.  In addition, 
institutional anomie theory is difficult to test, and some wonder if any tests using units of 
analysis at levels other than comparing nations truly tests the efficacy of the theory.   
 This current thesis can lend itself to the literature of both deterrence and 
institutional anomie theory, and can begin to help address the gap in literature on local 
criminal justice investment decisions. Although, one must caution against the utility of 
this thesis contributing to literature regarding local spending, as the unit of analysis is 
states.  As this study looks at local spending aggregate at the state level, one must be 
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cautious with interpreting the results.  More will be discussed in the section on 
limitations.   
 As stated previously, the following study will address the following hypotheses 
using local data aggregated at the state level:   
H1:  As social services expenditures increase (as a proportion of total expenditures), 
the  violent and property crime rates decrease.   
H2:  As public safety expenditures increase (as a proportion of total expenditures), the 
violent and property crime rates decrease.   
H3:  As education expenditures increase (as a proportion of total expenditures), the 
violent and property crime rates decrease.   
H4:  Investments in social services (as a proportion of total expenditures), will have 
the  largest inverse relationship with crime rates than public safety and education 
expenditures (all as proportions of total expenditures) 
H5:  The effects of the investments in social services, public safety, or education (all 







Chapter V.  Methodology 
Data 
 The data for this paper include local level spending in the United States 
aggregated at the state level.  Therefore, there will be 51 observations for each variable, 
one for each state and the District of Columbia.  Each observation represents all of the 
measured local spending within that state.  Choosing one state and measuring local 
spending does not take into consideration the different policies and practices among 
states; the findings would not be generalizable to other states.  By measuring all localities 
within each state, we can begin to see if there are any relationships between local 
investments aggregated to the state level and crime rates. 
 It is important to note that there is some ambiguity regarding local level spending 
aggregated to the state level, as the funding streams for local government programs are 
often mixed with state and federal funding.  The money for local expenditures might 
include different funding streams, and might not be consistent from state to state.   
 The next step is to view the mean and standard deviation of each key variable.  












Percent High School Graduates 86.53 
 
3.43 
 Percent Below Poverty 13.46 
 
3.02 
 Percent Male ages 15-19 3.77 
 
0.34 
 Percent NonWhite 24 
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 Proportion Education Expenditures 0.39 
 
0.09 
 Proportion Social Services 0.11 
 
0.08 





 The focus of this paper is to determine if local investments aggregated at the state 
level in social services, public safety, and education are associated with crime rates.  It is 





Measuring Social Services, Public Safety and Education: Independent Variables 
 Expenditures are determined by adding local spending numbers as demonstrated 
in the 2007 Census of Governments: Finance, Table 2, Local Government Finances by 
Type of Government and State: 2006 – 2007.  Local spending consists of county 
government, municipal government, township government, special district government 
amount, and school district amount all added together for each state. 
 The three main independent variables are Proportion Social Services, Proportion 
Public Safety, and Proportion Education, all originally in thousands of dollars of 
expenditures, and all presented as proportions of total local expenditures.  These will 
measure investments in social services, public safety (including corrections), and 
education respectively.  The Proportion Social Services variable is a measure comprised 
of the total local spending aggregated at the state level of public welfare (such as cash 
assistance payments, vendor payments, and other qualifying payments), hospitals, health, 
social insurance administration and veterans services, all in the thousands. These data 
come from the 2007 Census of Governments: Finance, more specifically, Table 2, Local 
Government Finances by Type of Government and State: 2006 – 2007. 
 The second main independent variable, Proportion Public Safety, comes from the 
same data source as Proportion Social Services.  Proportion Public Safety is a measure of 
local spending aggregated at the state level on police protection, fire protection, 
corrections, protection inspection, and regulation, all in the thousands of dollars and 
presented as a proportion of the total local spending.   
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 The third and final independent variable is Proportion Education.  The data for 
this variable are also found in the 2007 Census of Governments: Finance.  Proportion 
Education is a measure of local spending aggregated at the state level on higher, 
elementary, secondary and other education, also presented as a proportion of total local 
spending.   
 The U.S. Census Bureau conducts a Census of Governments every 5 years since 
1957.  The 2007 Census of Governments, where data for the three main independent 
variables originate, contains survey information from 50 states and 89,476 local 
governments (counties, municipalities, special districts and school districts) which 
includes the District of Columbia.  The survey collects information on revenue, 
expenditure, debt and assets; for this paper, the focus remained on local expenditure data 
aggregated to the state level for social services, public safety, and education (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2007).     
 Data are collected through mail canvassing, internet collection and central 
collection from state sources.  A review of government accounting records for the 48 
largest and most complex municipal and county governments is completed for obtaining 
data.  In 28 states, data for local governments were consolidated by state agencies.  
Additional data for local governments were obtained via mail questionnaires (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2007). 
 For the Census of Governments, data for years ending in numbers besides ‘2’ or 
‘7’ are from sample surveys and are therefore subject to sampling error.  Since the data 
for this project are from year 2007, sampling error discussions are not pertinent.  
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However, there are nonsampling errors to consider.  Nonsampling errors can include 
inability to obtain data, inaccuracies in classification, response errors, misinterpretation 
of questions, mistakes in keying and coding, and coverage errors (U.S Census Bureau 
Finance Methodology, 2007.  Nonsampling error can affect the results of this paper by 
providing an incomplete picture of the population as a whole, possibly negating the 
ability to generalize findings to the entire population (Bachman & Paternoster, 2004). 
 For the 2007 Census of Government Finance, the overall response rate was 81.2 
percent.   For local governments, the overall total unit response rate was 81.9 percent.  
The percentage of the total local estimates of expenditures reported ranged from 83.4 
percent to 100 percent (U.S. Census Bureau Finance Methodology, 2007).   
Measuring Crime Rates: Dependent Variables 
 The main dependent variables are property and violent crime rates per 100,000 
people for the years of 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010.  The crime rate measurement is 
separated by property and violent crime.  Data for both were collected from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s 2007 Uniform Crime Report, Table 5: Crime in the United 
States by State, 2007; Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 2008 Uniform Crime Report, 
Table 5: Crime in the United States by State, 2008; the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
2009 Uniform Crime Report, Table 5: Crime in the United States by State, 2009; and 
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 2010 Uniform Crime Report, Table 5: Crime 
in the United States by State, 2010.  Violent crime is composed of four offenses; murder 
and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Report, Violent Crime, 2010).  Property crime is 
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composed of the offenses of burglary, larceny- theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Report, Property Crime, 2010).  The rates for both 
property and violent crime are calculated per 100,000 state inhabitants.   
 Table 5 of the UCR provides both the actual number of offenses reported and the 
estimated number of offenses in Metropolitan Statistical Areas, cities outside of 
metropolitan areas, nonmetropolitan counties, and the rate for each grouping, and the 
estimated population for each state.  It is important that offenses known to law 
enforcement from nonmetropolitan counties are included in data as of the United States’ 
3,068 counties nearly two-thirds are designated as rural (National Association of 
Counties). 
 It is important to note that the property and violent crime rates are being looked at 
across several years.  This is done in order to study if there is a lag in the effect of 
investments.  Programs that may have been allocated additional funds in fiscal year 2006 
to 2007 may increase the proportion of social services spending, for instance, but may not 
demonstrate an effect on the crime rate until several years later.  With social services, 
public safety programs, and education there may not be an immediate effect of 
investments.  To account for this, the study will use crime data from 2007 to 2010 in 
order to determine if a lag effect is present.  Structuring the dependent variables this way 
allows this study to test if there is a relationship between the independent and dependent 






 Independent variables are those that are manipulated in order to measure the 
impact on the dependent variable.  For the purposes of this study, the Total Local Social 
Services Expenditures, Total Local Public Safety Expenditures and Total Local 
Education Expenditures, presented as proportions of the total local expenditures 
aggregated to the state level, are the main independent variables.   
 It is important to note that especially for the independent variables measuring the 
proportion of public safety and social services expenditures that these variables contain 
components that cannot be disaggregated (please refer to Table 2).  Better measures 
would be disaggregated to determine which, if any, specific social services or public 
safety components are related to crime.  As is, the social service and public safety 
variables in particular may include components that are not related to crime.   












Table 2.  Independent Variables 







of total local 
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Is a measure of public welfare (cash assistance 
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Is a measure of police protection, fire protection, 
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A measure of education services, which includes 
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Governments: Finance, 
Table 2.  Local 
Government Finances 
by Type of Government 
and State: 2006 - 07.  
 
Control Variables 
 Control variables are those that are used in order to measure the impact of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable.  Control variables attempt to hold 
everything equal in order to test the true effects of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable, and control for any outside influences that may also be influencing 
changes in the dependent variable.  As there are 51 total observations, four control 
variables were chosen.  The control variables, their definitions, years, and data sources 
are in Table 3.   
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Table 3.  Control Variables 
 
Variable Definition Year Data Source 
Percent 
NonWhite 
Percent NonWhite was calculated by 
subtracting the %White (a person having 
origins in any of the original peoples of 
Europe, the Middle East, or North 
Africa. It includes people who indicate 
their race as "White" or report entries 
such as Irish, German, Italian, Lebanese, 
Near Easterner, Arab, or Polish) from 
100.  
2010 
US Census Bureau, State 




High School Graduates include people 
whose highest degree was a high school 
diploma or its equivalent, people who 
attended college or professional school, 
and persons who received a college, 
university, or professional degree. 
Persons who reported completing the 
12th grade but not receiving a diploma 
are not high school graduates.  These 
data include only persons 25 years old 
and over. The percentages are obtained 
by dividing the counts of graduates by 




US Census Bureau, State 





Families and persons are classified as 
below poverty if their total family 
income or unrelated individual income 
was less than the poverty threshold 
specified for the applicable family size, 
age of householder, and number of 
related children under 18 present. The 
Census Bureau uses the federal 
government's official poverty definition. 
2006-
2010 
US Census Bureau, State 
and County QuickFacts. 
Percent 
Males ages 
15 – 19 years 
old 







These control variables were chosen using an empirical approach, selected due to their 
high correlation with both the independent and dependent variables
1
.  Controlling for 
variables highly correlated with the independent and dependent variables accounts for 
making false assumptions regarding the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables.   
 With the control variables chosen, it is important to consider the advantages and 
limitations of using data from the U.S. Census Bureau and the FBI’s Uniform Crime 
Reports for the independent and dependent variables, respectively. 
U.S. Census Bureau Data 
 Data from the U.S. Census Bureau for this project come specifically from its 
Census of Governments, Finance.  Data from the 2007 Census of Governments, Finance, 
are not from sample surveys and therefore are not subject to sampling error discussions.  
Census Bureau data is generally highly regarded, as its data collection policies and 
procedures are of high quality and meticulous pretesting occurs prior to data collection 
(Mosher, Miethe, & Phillips, 2002).   
 However, there are nonsampling errors to consider, such as the inability to obtain 
data, inaccuracies in classification, response errors, misinterpretation of questions, 
mistakes in keying and coding, and coverage errors.  Rates of response differ across 
sociodemographic categories and across geographical regions.  For instance, for the 2000 
                                                          
1
 As noted in Appendix A, there is a high correlation of .76 between the Percent High School Graduates 
and Percent Below Poverty variables, indicating a potential multicollinearity problem.  After running 
analyses with one of these variables omitted, the coefficient and standard error for the remaining variable 
did not change considerably, so both variables were included in the models.   
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Census it is estimated that between 6.4 and 8.6 million people were not counted (Mosher 
et al., 2002).  However, the Census also has the problem of over counting people; it is 
estimated that in the 2000 Census, approximately 4 million people were counted twice 
(Mosher et al., 2002).  All of these nonsampling errors must leave one cautious when 
interpreting the findings of this current study, as any findings may not be generalizable to 
the entire population (Bachman & Paternoster, 2004).   
 The reliability and validity of Census Bureau data are also subject to question 
wording effects, question order effects, and response effects (Mosher et al., 2002).  
Questions might be worded in ways that are up for interpretation, or use words that are 
defined differently by different people.  The ordering of questions can also have an effect 
on responses; putting a certain question first may influence responses to additional 
questions.  Response effects also affect the reliability and validity of Census Bureau data.  
There may be issues of memory, respondents may not be completely truthful, and 
respondents may not have a general knowledge of the subject matter (Mosher et al., 
2002). 
 While the Census of Governments, Finance, utilizes surveys, mail questionnaires, 
and government accounting records for data and therefore is subject to the validity and 
reliability questions posed above, Census Bureau data is generally considered very high 
quality and therefore is the best account of local spending on social services, education 





Uniform Crime Report 
 The International Chiefs of Police created a committee in 1927 to determine the 
possibility of collecting uniform crime reports across jurisdictions for comparative 
purposes.  The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) were born, and published for the first time 
in January of 1930.  The UCR reflects the number of crimes reported to the police by the 
public.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation of the U.S. Department of Justice took over 
the publication of the UCR in September of 1930 (Mosher et al., 2002).   
 There are many critiques of official crime data.  In the beginning of UCR 
reporting, there were concerns regarding underreporting by police departments.  Some 
police departments expressed concern that if numbers of reported crimes to police were 
high, the public would use the information to rate their effectiveness (Mosher et al., 
2002).  Numbers could also suffer from bad record keeping and a lack of understanding 
regarding the classification of reported crimes (Mosher et al., 2002).  In addition, many 
crimes may not be reported to police, so the reported crimes may not represent all of the 
crime that is actually occurring in a particular area. 
 Self- report studies are another method of determining the number of crimes that 
occur, as they potentially include crimes both reported to police and not reported to 
police.  However, this type of crime data collection is also subject to error.  Not all people 
may be forthcoming about reporting incidences.  In addition, there may be issues with 
instrument design and question wording and order when attempting to gather information 




 The accuracy of police counts of reported crime is subject to some uncertainty.  
However, the UCR is widely accepted as one measure of crime, and one of the only 
measures that encompasses most of the United States (Mosher et al., 2002).  Therefore, 
when needing a count of crime across as many jurisdictions as possible in the United 
States, as is needed for this particular paper, the UCR is useful.  
Analysis 
 For this analysis, there are fifty- one observations for each variable; 50 states and 
the District of Columbia.  It is important to note that the three main independent variables 
and the dependent variables are continuous variables.  A total of thirty- two multiple 
regression analyses will be completed to determine if there are any significant 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables.   
1. The first set of multiple regressions will test the relationship between social 
services spending and the crime rate separately for each year from 2007-2010.   
2. The second set of multiple regressions will test the relationship between social 
services spending and the crime rate separately for each year from 2007-2010.   
3. The third set of multiple regressions will test the relationship between public 
safety spending and the crime rates for each year from 2007-2010. 
 Another multiple regression analyses will test which independent variable has the 
largest effect on the crime rates for each year separately from 2007-2010.  In order to do 
this, beta weights are calculated for the independent variables in order to convert all 
independent variables to a common scale to allow for comparison.  In addition, only the 
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two strongest control variables, Percent Below Poverty and Percent NonWhite, are 
utilized for the regressions using beta weights.  The final regression analyses will test 
whether or not there are any appearances of lag effects regarding the investments and the 
crime rates for years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
 These regression analyses will determine if there are relationships between the 
proportion of local spending aggregated to the state level regarding social services, public 
safety, and education and the property and violent crime rates from 2007, 2008, 2009 and 
2010.   
 It will also allow for testing which independent variable has the larger effect, 












Chapter VI.  Results  
 When analyzing the data I used a directional hypothesis test since my hypothesis 
predicted a specific direction regarding the relationship between local educational, social 
services and public safety expenditures aggregated to the state level and property and 
crime rates for years 2007 through 2010.  Since the sample size is small (n=51) there is a 
risk of having low power for my hypothesis tests.  To address the risk of low power, I 
used an alpha level of .10.  For each hypothesis test I will reject the null hypothesis if the 
p-value is less than or equal to .10. 
 Using an alpha of .10 for a directional test means that the risk of making a Type I 
error, i.e. rejecting a null hypothesis that is true, is increased compared to using a 
standard alpha of .05 or .01.  It also indicates that the chances for making a Type II error, 
i.e. failing to reject a false null hypothesis, is minimized compared to using an alpha of 
.05 or .01.  With the current data examining possible relationships between expenditures 
and crime levels, it is comfortable to assume a risk of rejecting a true null hypothesis 10 
times out of 100. Given that the cost of making a Type I error in this situation is not 
grave, a higher alpha than is conventionally used is appropriate.  In addition, when using 
a small sample, such as is the case with this study, the probability of a Type II error may 
be too high.  By increasing the alpha, we are minimizing the chances of a Type II error.     
 An initial examination of the results can be gleaned from a series of simple, 
bivariate regressions (OLS) with property and violent crime rates from 2007 to 2010 




Table 4. Bivariate Regression for Educational, Social Service, and Public Safety Expenditures on Property and Violent Crime Rates-2007-
2010 
        Property Crime 
  2007    2008    2009    2010 
  b  se  b  se  b  se  b  se 
Education -3961.26 1018.47 -3010.14* 1033.41 -2768.84* 933.46  -2603.98* 892.16 
Social Services 2812.90* 1383.32 277.61* 1325.75 2351.22* 1207.59 2498.75* 1140 
Public Safety 9391.73* 4825.65 7775.11* 4681.78 6612.81 4254.61 5211.62 4088.06 
 
Violent Crime 
  2007    2008    2009    2010 
  b  se  b  se  b  se  b  se 
Education -828.77  325.73  -793.86* 318.65  -719.47* 294.52  -664.73* 278.56 
Social Services 1338.64* 383.45  1300.69* 374.62  1168.33* 347.68  1085.02* 329.19 




 Table 4 presents the bivariate results for the regressions of the proportion of local 
expenditures aggregated to the state level for education, social services, and public safety 
on the property and violent crime rates from 2007 to 2010.  These regression analyses are 
used as baseline regressions to inform the analyses of the multivariate regressions with 
the control variables.   
 The results for the bivariate analysis for educational expenditures are as predicted.  
The proportion of education spending has a significant inverse relationship with property 
crime and violent crimes rates for years 2007 through 2010.  The magnitudes of the 
regression coefficients are fairly comparable over the four year period which is not too 
surprising since the correlation in both property and violent crime rates over the years is 
high (in the .90s).  An increase in the proportion of local expenditures aggregated to the 
state level for education of .01 reduces the property crime rate by about 3,000 per 
100,000 population and the violent crime rate by about 700 per 100,000 population. 
These bivariate results suggest that the higher the proportion of local expenditures 
aggregated to the state level that are for education lower the property and violent crime 
rate for that state.  
 The results for social service expenditures do not support the conjecture from 
institutional anomie theory. For both property and violent crime, the bivariate regression 
coefficients for social service expenditures is statistically significant for every year, but 
the relationship is positive.  This suggests that an increase in social service expenditures 
is related to an increase in both property and violent crime.  
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 The results for public safety expenditures are more surprising. While all of the 
bivariate regression coefficients are positive, contrary to expectations, the results show 
that an increase in a state’s aggregated local public safety expenditures is related to an 
increase in both property and violent crime.  However, only two of these coefficients 
across the four year period are significantly different from zero (2007 and 2008, both for 
property crime).  
 These bivariate regressions are important to know as baseline data prior to 
running the multivariate regressions, as they inform the overall picture of any 
relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variables.   
 We now move to a discussion regarding the multivariate results.  Thirty- two 
multiple regression models were created to test each independent variable with each year 
2007 through 2010 of violent and property crime data, to test which independent variable 
has the largest effect on the crime data for each year 2007 to 2010, and to see if a lag 
effect exists. Using a directional hypothesis with an alpha of .10, several models indicate 
that the independent variables are significant, while several do not.  To best describe the 
results of the data, it is best to refer back to the original hypotheses this thesis set out to 
address: 
H1:  As social services expenditures increase (as a proportion of total expenditures), 
the  violent and property crime rates decrease.   
H2:  As public safety expenditures increase (as a proportion of total expenditures), the 
violent and property crime rates decrease.   
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H3:  As education expenditures increase (as a proportion of total expenditures), the 
violent and property crime rates decrease.   
H4:  Investments in social services (as a proportion of total expenditures), will have 
the  largest inverse relationship with crime rates than public safety and education 
expenditures (all as proportions of total expenditures) 
H5:  The effects of the investments in social services, public safety, or education (all 
as proportions of total expenditures) on violent/ property crime rates will increase 
over time. 
H1:  As social services expenditures increase (as a proportion of total expenditures), the 
violent and property crime rates decrease.   
Property Crime 
 The Proportion of Social Services variable did not exhibit any significant 
relationships with the property crime rate for years 2007 through 2010.  However, the 
control variables Percent NonWhite and Percent Below Poverty both exhibited positive 
significant relationships in each of the models testing the relationship between social 
services and property crime from years 2007 to 2010.  Both of these control variables 
were significant at a .05 level throughout these models.  The control variables Percent 
High School Graduates (with the exception of property crime in 2010) and Percent Male 
Ages 15 to 19 are not significant in any of these models testing the relationship between 





 When observing the relationship between social services and violent crime, the 
Proportion Social Services variable is positively significant throughout all of the models 
testing its relationship to violent crime in years 2007 to 2010.  In addition, all control 
variables are significant, with the exception of Percent High School Graduates, which 
was not significant in any model pertaining to measuring the relationship between 
proportion social services and the violent crime rate for years 2007 through 2010.   
 In each model testing Proportion Social Services to Violent Crime, the 
relationship is not an inverse one.  Instead, each model indicates that as the Proportion of 
Social Services increases, so does the violent crime rate.   
 For every .01 increase in the proportion of social services spending, there is an 
increase in violent crime by approximately 598 per 100,000 population in 2007.  
The variables in the model account for approximately 51 percent of the variability 
of the violent crime rate in 2007. 
 For every .01 increase in the proportion of social services spending, there is an 
increase in violent crime by approximately 574 per 100,000 people in 2008.  The 
variables in the model account for approximately 52 percent of the variability of 
the violent crime rate in 2008. 
 For every .01 increase in the proportion of social services spending, there is an 
increase in violent crime by approximately 487 per 100,000 people in 2009.  The 
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variables in the model account for approximately 51 percent of the variability of 
the violent crime rate in 2009. 
 For every .01 increase in the proportion of social services spending, there is an 
increase in violent crime by about 409 per 100,000 people in 2010.  The variables 
in the model account for approximately 49 percent of the variability of the violent 




Table 5. Regression Results for Property Crime and Proportion of Expenditures on Social Services – 2007-2010 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       2007     2008        2009        2010 
   b   se  b   se  b   se  b   se 
P Social Services -168.29   1300.90 -8.76   1255.06 -353.67   1100.85 -169.77   1047.26 
% Non-White  30.64*   7.34  24.63*   7.09  25.33*   6.22  23.33*   5.91 
% HS Grad  45.45   45.57  26.84   43.97  31.89   38.57  47.12*   36.69 
% Below Poverty 124.34*  51.94  118.68*  50.11  117.71*  43.95  129.07*  41.81 
% Males 15-19  -5.99   287.88 -209.71   277.74 -40.23   243.62 -90.11   231.76 
 
CONSTANT  -3101.20  -584.93   -1785.71  -3121.73 
R2   .44   .44   .47   .47 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*Coefficient significant at least at p < .10. 
 
 
Table 6. Regression Results for Violent Crime and Proportion of Expenditures on Social Services – 2007-2010 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       2007        2008        2009        2010 
   b     se  b     se  b     se  b     se 
P Social Services 598.24*    361.43 574.57*    351.34 486.88*    327.63 409.43*    313.62 
% Non-White  7.27*     2.04  7.16*     1.98  6.66*     1.85  6.43*     1.77 
% HS Grad  5.82     12.66 6.90     12.31 7.35     11.48 12.54     10.99 
% Below Poverty 24.80*     14.43 24.26*     14.03 23.64*     13.08 26.70*     12.52 
% Males 15-19  -140.47*  79.98  -151.58*   77.75 -137.64*   72.50 -136.93*   69.40 
 
CONSTANT  -118.80   -165.64   -245.77   -741.72 
R2   .51   .52   .51   .49 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*Coefficient significant at least at p < .10. 
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H2:  As public safety expenditures increase (as a proportion of total expenditures), the 
violent and property crime rates decrease.   
Property Crime 
 The Proportion of Public Safety expenditures variable was not significant in any 
of the models testing its relationship with the property crime rate for years 2007 through 
2010.  However, the control variables Percent NonWhite and Percent Below Poverty 
were both positively significant in each of the models testing the relationship between 
social services and property crime from years 2007 to 2010.  Both of these control 
variables were significant at a .05 level throughout these models.  The control variables 
Percent High School Graduates and Percent Male Ages 15 to 19 are not significant in any 
of these models with the exception of 2010, when Percent High School Graduates 
demonstrates a significant positive relationship with the property crime rate.   
Violent Crime 
 When observing the relationship between public safety and violent crime, the 
Proportion Public Safety variable is significant in two of the models testing its 
relationship to violent crime in years 2007 to 2010. Proportion Public Safety was not 
found to be significantly related to the violent crime rate in 2007 and 2009.  However, in 
2008 and 2010, Proportion Public Safety is found to have a significant inverse 
relationship with violent crime.   
 In the 2008 model that indicates Proportion Public Safety is found to have a 
significant relationship with violent crime, the variables in this model account for 
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approximately 51 percent of the variability in the violent crime rate.  The model indicates 
a significant relationship where as the proportion of public safety expenditures increases, 
the violent crime rate decreases.  More specifically, for every .01 increase in the 
proportion of public safety spending, there is a decrease of 1742 violent crimes per 
100,000 people in 2008.   
 In the 2010 model, there is a significant inverse relationship between the 
proportion of public safety spending and violent crime.  Specifically, for every .01 
increase in the proportion of public safety expenditures, there is a decrease of 
approximately 1473 violent crimes per 100,000 people in 2010.      
 For the models that do not show a significant relationship between the proportion 
of public safety spending and the violent crime rate for years 2007 and 2009, all of the 




Table 7: Regression Results for Property Crime and Proportion of Expenditures on Public Safety – 2007-2010 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       2007        2008        2009        2010 
   b   se  b   se  b   se  b se 
P Public Safety  3194.04   4694.26 1629.05   4544.75 886.83   3994.44 131.16 3798.75 
% Non-White  27.94*   7.81  23.38*   7.57  24.05*   6.65  22.94* 6.32 
% HS Grad  48.54   43.54  29.30   42.16  29.27   37.05  45.40* 35.24 
% Below Poverty  129.88*   48.43  122.80*   46.89  114.07*   41.21  126.55* 39.19 
% Males 15-19  4.52   283.14  -206.98   274.13  -26.86   240.93  -84.13 229.13 
 
CONSTANT  -3728.64  -983.08   -1648.77  -2982.40 
R2   .45   .44   .47   .47   
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 




Table 8: Regression Results for Violent Crime and Proportion of Expenditures on Public Safety – 2007-2010 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       2007       2008        2009        2010 
   b   se  b      se  b     se  b       se 
P Public Safety  -1514.01  1330.96 -1742.20*  1285.40 -1514.92    1195.76 -1472.51*   1137.65 
% Non-White  9.44*   2.22  9.47*      2.14  8.64*     1.99  8.25*       1.89 
% HS Grad  10.22   12.35  10.67      11.92  10.49     11.09  14.87*       10.55 
% Below Poverty  30.92*   13.73  29.39*      13.26  27.88*     12.34  29.74*       11.74 
% Males 15-19  -163.11*  80.28  -173.76*     77.53  -156.48*    72.12  -153.08*      68.62 
 
CONSTANT  -346.96   -312.80   -360.81   -788.85 
R2   .50   .51   .50   .49   
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*Coefficient significant at least at p < .10. 
56 
 
H3:  As education expenditures increase (as a proportion of total expenditures), the 
violent and property crime rates decrease.   
Property Crime 
 The Proportion of Education expenditures only exhibits a significant relationship 
with the property crime rate of 2007.  In this model, the variables account for 
approximately 48 percent of the variability of the property crime rate for 2007.  The 
model also indicates that as the proportion of education expenditures increases, the 
property crime rate decreases.  Specifically, for every .01 increase in the proportion of 
education expenditures, there is a decrease of 2102 in the property crime rate for 2007.  
In this model, all of the control variables are significant with the exception of Percent 
High School Graduates.   
 The models that tested the relationship between the proportion of education 
expenditures and the property crime rate found no significant relationship for years 2008, 
2009 and 2010.  For these models, the control variables of Percent NonWhite and Percent 
Below Poverty remain significant, while Percent High School Graduates and Percent 
Males Ages 15 to 19 did not.   
Violent Crime 
 The models that test the relationship between the proportion of education 
expenditures and the violent crime rate did not find any significant relationship for years 
2007 through 2010.  However, in each of these models the control variables Percent 
NonWhite, Percent Below Poverty, and Males Ages 15 to 19 remain significant, while 
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Percent High School Graduates does not in all but the model for violent crime rate in 
2010.  
 In these models where there is no relationship indicated between the proportion of 
education expenditures and the violent crime rates for years 2007 to 2010, the remaining 
control variables account for approximately 48 percent of the variability in the violent 
crime rate.   
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Table 9. Regression Results for Property Crime and Proportion of Expenditures on Education – 2007-2010 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       2007        2008        2009        2010 
   b     se  b     se  b   se  b   se 
P Education  -2102.59 *  1217.80 -1107.59    1201.66 -804.29   1058.38 -625.76   1008.12 
% Non-White  19.82*     9.12  19.07*     9.00  20.69*   7.93  19.90*   7.55 
% HS Grad  9.76     46.12  8.96     45.51  14.96   40.08  35.14   38.18 
% Below Poverty  98.70*     47.47  106.52*     46.84  103.02*   41.26  119.42*   39.30 
% Males 15-19  10.60     275.60 -203.70     271.95 -24.03   239.52  -81.10   228.15 
 
CONSTANT  1336.03   1671.5   204.90   -1679.81 
R2   .48   .45   .48   .48 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 






Table 10. Regression Results for Violent Crime and Proportion of Expenditures on Education – 2007-2010 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       2007        2008        2009        2010 
   b   se  b   se  b   se  b   se 
P Education  62.48   359.66  114.39   349.08  125.50   323.78  185.89   307.54 
% Non-White  8.61*   2.69  8.73*   2.61  8.12*   2.42  8.07*   2.30 
% HS Grad  13.61   13.62  15.25   13.22  14.89   12.26  20.17*   11.65 
% Below Poverty  35.57*   14.02  35.19*   13.61  33.22*   12.62  35.62*   11.99 
% Males 15-19  -161.16*  81.39  -171.74*  79.00  -154.86*  73.27  -151.83*  69.60 
 
CONSTANT  -852.02   -980.22   -993.99   -1533.97 
R2   .48   .49   .48   .48   
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*Coefficient significant at least at p < .10. 
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H4:  Investments in social services (as a proportion of total expenditures), will have the 
largest inverse relationship with crime rates than public safety and education 
expenditures (all as proportions of total expenditures) 
 In order to test which independent variable might have the biggest effect on the 
dependent variables, beta weights were utilized in a multiple regression that included all 
three main independent variables and the two best control variables.  From the correlation 
matrix, the two control variables that are most highly correlated with the independent 
variables and the dependent variables are Percent NonWhite and Percent Below Poverty.  
These two control variables were used in the models testing which independent had the 
biggest effect on the violent and property crime rates for years 2007 through 2010. 
Property Crime 
 For property crime, the only model where any of the independent variables 
demonstrated a significant relationship was in 2007.  For this model, only the Proportion 
Education variable was significant, indicating that it has the strongest effect on property 
crime rates in 2007 than the other two independent variables.  This model indicates that 
for every .01 increase in the proportion of education expenditures, there is a decrease of 
2459 per 100,000 people in property crime in 2007.     
 Another item to note from this model is that the variable with the largest Beta is 
Percent Below Poverty, indicating that this variable has the largest effect on the property 
crime rate in 2007 out of the variables in this model.  The second largest effect is the 
variable of Percent NonWhite, followed by the Proportion Education variable.   
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 For the other models that tested the relationships between the property crime rates 
of years 2008,2009 and 2010, none of the three main independent variables demonstrated 
any significant relationships.  However, the Percent NonWhite and Percent Below 
Poverty variables were significant in all of these models, with Percent Below Poverty 
demonstrating the largest effect.   
Violent Crime 
 When testing which independent variable has the largest effect on the violent 
crime rates for years 2007 through 2010, the only significant variable is Proportion Social 
Services expenditures.   
 For every .01 increase in the proportion of social services spending, there is an 
increase of approximately 717 per 100,000 people in violent crime in 2007.  The 
Proportion Social Services variable is the only main independent variable that is 
significant. 
 For every .01 increase in the proportion of social services spending, there is an 
increase of approximately 698 per 100,000 people in violent crime in 2008.  The 
Proportion Social Services variable is the only main independent variable that is 
significant. 
 For every .01 increase in the proportion of social services spending, there is an 
increase of approximately 611 per 100,000 people in violent crime in 2009.  The 




 For every .01 increase in the proportion of social services spending, there is an 
increase of approximately 561 per 100,000 people in violent crime in 2010.  The 
Proportion Social Services variable is the only main independent variable that is 
significant. 
 For each of these models, the control variables of Percent NonWhite and Percent 
Below Poverty remain significant.  Percent NonWhite has the highest Beta in each 
model, indicating that this variable has the largest effect out of the variables included in 
this model on the violent crime rate for years 2007 through 2010. 
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Table 11. Regression Results for Property Crime and Proportion of Expenditures on Education, Social Services and Public Safety – 2007-2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  2007         2008         2009        2010 
   b        se  B b     se        B  b     se         B  b     se       B 
P Education  -2459.40*    1201.29 -.31 -1151.81   1196.55     -.15  -1190.42    1046.69     -.17  -1133.61 1006.24    -.17 
P Social Services  -714.20        1361.59 -.07 -126.77     1356.22    -.01  -601.72     1186.36      -.07  -301.41     1140.51    -.04 
P Public Safety  753.90        4768.20 .02 858.38     4749.40     .03  -658.04     4154.56     -.02  18.08         3994       -.05 
% Non-White  18.03*        8.48  .32 19.66*     8.44         .37  19.85*     7.38            .41  90.73         7.10*         .39 
% Below Poverty  97.83*        29.95 .38 97.41*     29.83         .40  94.59*     26.09          .43  94.59         25.08*       .43 
 
CONSTANT 2423.13    1738.79    1818.83    1837.29 
R2  .49    .45    .48    .47    
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 







Table 12. Regression Results for Violent Crime and Proportion of Expenditures on Education, Social Services and Public Safety – 2007-2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  2007         2008         2009        2010 
  b        se  B b     se        B  b     se         B  b     se       B 
P Education 211.61        354.81 .09 238.48     345.89      .10  217.67     322.15       .10  194.09     309.75     .09  
P Social Services 717.87*        402.16 .24 698.85*     392.04      .24  611.49*     365.14       .23  560.71*     351.09     .22 
P Public Safety -662.05        1408.33 -.06 -899.41     1372.92   -.09   -793.08     1278.69     -.08  -908.57     1229.48  -.10 
% Non-White 9.50*        2.50  .57 9.74*     2.44        .60   8.9*      2.27         .60  8.33*         2.19       .59 
% Below Poverty 15.08*        8.85  .20 13.03*     8.62        .18  12.51*      8.03         .18  11.07*     7.72       .17 
 
CONSTANT -103.85    -76.75    -60.28    -18.51 
R2  .49    .49    .48    .46   
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*Coefficient significant at least at p < .10. 
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H5:  The effects of the investments in social services, public safety, or education (all as 
proportions of total expenditures) on violent/ property crime rates will increase over time. 
 In order to look at changes in effects of investments over time, we must 
concentrate on violent crime.  This is because for property crime, the only significant 
relationship occurred in 2007 between the proportion of education spending and the 
property crime rate.  For all other years and main independent variables, none of the 
relationships were significant. 
 A test of whether or not the effects of investments on the violent crime rate 
change over time can also not be identified through using the Proportion Education main 
independent variable.  All models testing the relationship between the proportion of 
education expenditures and the violent crime rate for years 2007 through 2010 did not 
yield any significant relationships between the main independent variable and the 
dependent variable.  
 The main independent variable for the proportion of public safety expenditures 
can somewhat be utilized to determine any change in effect over time, as violent crime in 
2008 and 2010 found a significant relationship with the public safety variable.  The 
results do not indicate a lag effect from 2008 to 2010.  A .01 increase in the proportion of 
public safety expenditures does not demonstrate more of a decrease in 2010 than it did in 
2008.   
 To look more closely at a possible lag effect, we must look at Proportion Social 
Services, which has a significant relationship with violent crime for years 2007 through 
2010.  The coefficient for the Proportion Social Services variable decreases over time, 
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going from approximately 598 in 2007 to 409 in 2010.  The data indicate that from 2007 
to 2010, a .01 increase in the proportion of social services spending increases the violent 
crime rate less and less from 2007 to 2010.  In addition, the p-value for the Proportion 
Social Services variable decreases over time as well, indicating that the significance of 
the relationship between the proportion of social services expenditures and the violent 
crime rate decreases from 2007 to 2010.  By 2010, the p-value for Proportion Social 
Services is .099, indicating that the relationship between Proportion Social Services 
spending and the violent crime rate in 2010 is almost insignificant at a .10 level.   
 When using the model that tests all of the main independent variables together, 
the data share a similar story.  The proportion of social services expenditures is the only 
main independent variable to demonstrate a significant relationship over time, and only 
with violent crime.  The coefficient for Proportion of Social Services decreases from 
years 2007 to 2010.  In 2007, the coefficient is 717, and by 2010 it is 560.  The data 
indicate that a .01 increase in the proportion of social services spending increases the 
violent crime rate less and less from 2007 to 2010.  In addition, the p-value and the Beta 
for Proportion Social Services decreases over time as well, indicating that the 
significance of the relationship between the violent crime rate for years 2007 through 







 In sum, data from the statistical models indicate the following relationships: 
Nonsignificant Relationships 
 None of the main independent variables distributed significant relationships 
with the property crime rate for years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, with the 
one exception noted below. 
 The proportion of education spending was not found to have a significant 
relationship with the violent crime rate for years 2007,2008, 2009 and 2010.   
 The proportion of public safety spending did not have a significant 
relationship with the violent crime rate for years 2007 and 2009. 
Significant Relationships 
 As the proportion of education spending increases, the property crime rate of 
2007 decreases.  Similarly, when measuring which independent variable has 
the strongest effect on property crime, only one main independent variable in 
one model is significant.  As the proportion of education spending increases 
when all main independent variables are included, the property crime rate of 
2007 decreases.  The Proportion Education variable has the biggest effect on 




 As the proportion of public safety expenditures increases, the violent crime 
rates of 2008 and 2010 decrease.   
 As the proportion of social services expenditures increases, the violent crime 
rate for years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 increases as well.  Similarly, when 
measuring which independent variable has the strongest effect on violent 
crime, only one main independent variable is significant.  As the proportion of 
social services spending increases when all main independent variables are 
included, the violent crime rates of 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 increase as 
well.  The Proportion Social Services variable has the biggest effect on the 
violent crime rates in 2007 through 2010 compared to the other main 
independent variables.  The significance of this relationship diminishes over 
time.   
 The data indicate that the proportion of social services spending and the 
proportion of public safety spending do not have any relationship with the property crime 
rates.  The data also indicate that only for the year 2007 does the proportion of education 
expenditures have a significant inverse relationship with the property crime rate.  The fact 
that this significant relationship with property crime was not sustained for the years 2008, 
2009 and 2010 indicate that wholly, the relationship between property crime and the 
proportion of education spending is not strong.  Overall, the main independent variables 




 Somewhat similarly, the data indicate that the proportion of education spending 
did not display significant relationships with the violent crime rate for years 2007 through 
2010.  The data for public safety and violent crime is a bit more mixed.  There is a 
significant inverse relationship found between the proportion of public safety 
expenditures and the violent crime rate in 2008 and 2010.  As the proportion of public 
safety spending and the violent crime rate have a significant inverse relationship for 2008 
and 2010, we can look at these two models to see if there is any lag in the effect of the 
proportion of public safety spending on violent crime over time.  The data indicate that 
there is no lag in the effect of the proportion of public safety expenditures on the violent 
crime rate over time.  Instead, the effect of the proportion of public safety expenditures 
on the violent crime rate seems to diminish from 2008 to 2010 as the magnitude of the 
coefficient becomes smaller.  However, since only two of the four models that test the 
relationship between the proportion of public safety and violent crime were found 
significant, there is not enough information to be confident in any lag or lack thereof. 
 Interestingly, the proportion of social services spending has a significant 
relationship with violent crime for years 2007 through 2010.  The data show that this 
significant relationship is not an inverse one.  Instead, as the proportion of social services 
increases, the violent crime rate for years 2007 through 2010 increases as well.  This 
same holds true even when testing which main independent variable has the largest effect 
on violent crime.  The proportion of social services spending is the only main 
independent variable to have a significant relationship with violent crime for all four 
years of the model.   
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 As the proportion of social services expenditures is the only variable to display a 
significant relationship with violent crime for all four years included in the model, it is 
the only variable for which to reliably study in these models to see if there is any lag in 
the effect of the proportion of social services expenditures over time.  The data indicate 
that there is no lag in the effect of the proportion of social services expenditures on the 
violent crime rate over time.  Instead, the effect of the proportion of social services 
expenditures on the violent crime rate seems to diminish from 2007 to 2010.   
 The data indicate that two of the control variables have significant relationships 
with both property and violent crime rates for years 2007 through 2010, and that their 
relationships to the dependent variables are stronger than the main independent variables, 
as evidenced by the Beta testing.  The Percent Below Poverty and Percent NonWhite 
variables may be the most significant variables that account for more of the variability in 
the property and violent crime rates of 2007 through 2010 than the main independent 
variables.   
 The data also indicate that the Percent High School Graduates is perhaps not the 
best control variable to use in these models.  This variable remained insignificant in a 
large majority of the models, similar to the Percent Male Ages 15 to 19 which displayed 
insignificant relationships in some models, but not all.   
 Overall, the data in these models seem to indicate that there is a small amount of 
support that as the proportion of public safety expenditures increases, the violent crime 
rate may decrease, and as the proportion of education expenditures increases, the property 
crime decreases.  However, the data also indicate that as the proportion of social services 
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spending increases, the violent crime rate increases as well.  Most surprisingly, the data 
consistently show that the percent nonwhite and the percent below poverty have 
significant relationships with both property and violent crime rates for years 2007 
through 2010, that these relationships are more significant than any of the three main 
independent variables, and that both the property and violent crime rates for years 2007 
to 2010 increase as the percents of people who are nonwhite and below poverty increase.   
 It is most important to note that it is difficult to draw any sound conclusions given 
the data and the limitations of the current study.  However, it is useful to move forward 













CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Theory 
 The implications these data have for theory are numerous.  For institutional 
anomie theory, these data indicate some support, but not much.  By increasing the 
proportion of expenditures in education and public safety, one might argue that this thesis 
measures the strength of institutions by the proportion of total budget spending on 
particular areas.  For the larger the proportion of education expenditures out of the total 
budget, one could argue the stronger the institution is.  This same argument can be made 
for public safety, as well.  However, since the strength of the institution is being 
measured by the proportion of total expenditures, one could argue that even though 
institutions may be considered ‘stronger’ as their proportion of the total budget increases, 
they are still gaining strength as a result of money, which then does not truly weaken the 
economic institution. 
 In addition, the fact that these data in these models demonstrate a significant 
relationship between the proportion of social services and the violent crime rate for years 
2007 to 2010 that show that as the proportion of social services expenditures increases 
the violent crime rate also increases, does not bode well for institutional anomie theory.  
As the proportion of social services expenditures increases, in theory so does the strength 
of public welfare, as that is measured within the social services variable.  If we measure 
the strength of the public welfare system in part by the amount of the proportion of total 
expenditures it is allotted, then according to institutional anomie theory, we might expect 
the crime rate to fall as the strength of the institution increases, i.e., the proportion of 
71 
 
local expenditures allotted to it increase.  This was not the case; instead, the proportion of 
social services did not demonstrate a significant relationship with property crime, and 
instead, demonstrated a significant positive relationship with violent crime by suggesting 
an increase in the proportion of social services expenditures is associated with an increase 
in the violent crime rate as for years 2007 through 2010. 
 Institutional anomie theory was originally conceived in part as an explanation for 
the high violent crime rate in the United States (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2006).  With this 
in mind, one might propose that to support the tenants of institutional anomie theory, the 
stronger the institutions of social services and education (measured here as proportions of 
total local expenditures aggregated to the state level) would demonstrate an inverse 
relationship with the violent crime rate, specifically.  The data do not demonstrate this 
relationship.  The education expenditures variable did not demonstrate a significant 
relationship with violent crime.  The social services expenditures variable did 
demonstrate a significant relationship with violent crime, but not in the expected 
direction.  These results do not demonstrate strong support for institutional anomie 
theory.   
 The public safety expenditures variable also lends some insight into possible 
support for institutional anomie theory.  Institutional anomie theory might predict that by 
strengthening the institution of public safety the crime rate should decrease.  These data 
show that for years 2008 and 2010, there is a significant relationship between the 
proportion of public safety expenditures aggregated to the state level and the violent 
crime rate.  This result cautiously lends some support to institutional anomie theory; as 
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the institution of public safety got stronger through more proportion of expenditures, the 
violent crime rate decreased for years 2008 and 2010.  However, it also again brings up 
the dichotomy of measuring the strength of the public safety institution through the 
proportion of expenditures.  One has to consider if the strength of the economic 
institution is really mitigated by utilizing expenditures as the measure of the strength of 
other institutions.  This also has larger considerations for how institutional anomie is 
tested, including how to test the strength of institutions as well as their relative strength 
related to each other.   
 With deterrence theory, one might expect that as the proportion of public safety 
spending increases, which for this variable means an increase in expenditures for 
corrections and police among other items, the property and crime rates will decrease.  
There were no significant relationships found between the proportion of public safety 
expenditures and the property crime rate for years 2007 through 2010.  Significant 
relationships were found with regard to the proportion of public safety expenditures and 
crime in the expected direction, but only for violent crime in the years 2008 and 2010.  In 
the models for years 2007 and 2009, the proportion of public safety expenditures did not 
have a significant relationship with violent crime.  However, in the two models that were 
significant, the relationship took the expected direction.  That is, as the proportion of 
public safety expenditures increase, the violent crime rate for 2008 and 2010 decreases, 
indicating initial mixed support for deterrence theory.  As will be discussed in the 
Limitation section, these results could be affected by using aggregate variables.  In 
addition, nonlinearities in the data were not explored.  Addressing both of these 
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limitations in future research could lead to additional insights into the relationships but 
also have additional implications for theory as well.   
Policy 
 The policy implications with regard to the data of the current study are mixed.  
The current data suggest that perhaps one way to lower the property rate is to invest in 
education.  The current data also suggest that one way to lower the violent crime rate is to 
invest in public safety.  However, since both of these conclusions are based on one or two 
significant models, respectively, the results are not overwhelming that these strategies 
would produce any real decreases in crime rates. 
 The data in this study suggest that increasing the proportion of social services 
expenditures could account in part for an increase in the violent crime rate.  This 
indicates to jurisdictions that increasing the proportional investment in social services 
may not result in a lowered violent crime rate, but may actually be contributing to 
increases in the violent crime rate.  This would discourage jurisdictions from increasing 
the proportion of social services expenditures. 
 As the data from the current models demonstrate, there does not appear to be a lag 
in the effect of the proportion of education, public safety, and social services over time.  
One might consider though that the lag time is more than four years.  Even if a longer lag 
time were to show that investments might contribute to decreasing crime, it would be 
difficult to convince policy makers to invest in strategies that do not yield results for 
years to come. 
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 The data need to be considered in the context of limitations, discussed more 
thoroughly in the following section.  These data are not meant to indicate any causal 
relationships; causal relationships cannot be determined with these data.  The results 
could mean that spending additional money on social services is a response to crime 
rates, rather than crime rates are somewhat of a response to the proportion of 
expenditures being spent on social services.  The data might also not mean either of these 
conclusions.  The conclusions, results and implications for theory and policy must be 
considered in light of the limitations of the current study. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 There are many limitations to the current study that must be considered regarding 
the efficacy and generalizability of the data.  To begin with, the data used for this study 
are cross- sectional data.  Due to this, causal inferences cannot be made.  For instance, the 
significant relationship between the proportion of social services spending and the violent 
crime rate for 2007 through 2010 does not demonstrate any causal relationship.  The 
results could mean that spending additional money on social services is a response to 
prior crime rates, rather than crime rates are somewhat of a response to the proportion of 
expenditures being spent on social services.  This simultaneity that expenditures are 
affecting crime and crime is affecting expenditures produces bias in the estimated effects 
of the relationship.   
 The independent variables themselves are cause for proceeding cautiously with 
interpreting the data outcomes in this study.  The proportion of social services variable is 
a measure of public welfare, hospitals, health, social insurance administration, and 
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veterans’ services expenditures.  The proportion of public safety variable is a measure of 
police protection, fire protection, corrections, protection inspection and regulation.  The 
components of these variables could not be siphoned off for individual testing in this 
study.  As this study could not differentiate among the type of social services spending or 
public safety, it is impossible to tell if maybe some components of these variables are 
related to crime while others are not, further muddling the results.  It should also be 
considered that the components of the main independent variables might be related to 
crime in different directions, which could lead to null results, another possible limitation 
of using aggregate variables. 
 In regards to the independent and control variables, the R-squared hovered around 
the 50 percent mark for most significant models.  This means that although 
approximately half of the variability of the dependent variables could be explained by the 
variables in the models, half of the variability of the dependent variables remains 
unexplained.  Considering the models do not utilize many control variables due to the 
low number of observations, this speaks well of the current model but still leaves half of 
the variability unaccounted for.  Therefore, there may be other independent variables with 
higher Betas that have a stronger effect on the dependent variables than any of the 
variables included in the current model. 
 Another limitation of the current study is in regards to using data that may be 
affected by nonsampling error.  Nonsampling error is especially important to consider in 
regards to the main independent variables, which all come from the Census of 
Governments: Finance, 2007.  Nonsampling errors can include inability to obtain data, 
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inaccuracies in classification, response errors, misinterpretation of questions, mistakes in 
keying and coding, and coverage errors (U.S Census Bureau Finance Methodology, 
2007).  Nonsampling error may lead to an incomplete picture of the characteristics of the 
population as a whole; in the current study, an incomplete picture of the independent 
variables.  With an incomplete picture, this paper is making inferences without knowing 
the full story.  The error that comes from using data subject to nonsampling is that the 
findings of this paper may not be generalizable to the whole population (Bachman & 
Paternoster, 2004).  The data collected for the study’s results may also be inaccurate or 
incomplete, leading to less efficacy of the current results.   
 The results of the thesis must also be interpreted with caution due to the mixed 
nature of federal, state and local funding.  This current thesis studied the effects of local 
spending aggregated to the state level on the property and crime rates.  One must caution 
against the utility of this thesis contributing to literature regarding local spending, as the 
unit of analysis is states.  As this study looks at local spending aggregate at the state 
level, the results should be interpreted cautiously.   
 As the expenditure data are local spending monies aggregated to the state level, 
this study will not exhibit any true local differences, just the differences between states.  
Localities often have more flexibility and freedom to implement different programs and 
policies than states.  For instance if a county has a Sheriff that is very supportive of 
rehabilitation policies, that county may focus on programs and policies that are more 
rehabilitation focused rather than punitive.  At the same time, a county could have a 
Sheriff and County Commissioner who believe in deterrence strategies.  This may lead to 
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less investment in rehabilitative strategies.  We cannot measure these differences between 
localities in this study as the local investments are aggregate to the state level.  The 
difference between localities will not be represented here, as the results of their 
investment decisions are canceled out and undetectable when aggregated to the state 
level.   
 In addition, although they are often in silos, different levels of government most 
often do not function in complete isolation of each other.  Federal and state policies can 
influence local decision making, and vice versa.  Funding streams are also often 
ambiguous, as state and federal funding can often be part of local expenditures.   
 Future research should focus on local expenditures at the county or city level 
specifically, not aggregated to the state level, in order to parse out the differences 
between localities.  Future research should also focus on the funding streams that go into 
localities, and should parse out the federal, state and local funding that goes into local 
expenditures for social services, public safety and education.  When researching funding 
streams, it should also be taken into account that corrections often include social services 
spending in their budgets.  The current study does not take into account that corrections 
spending can also include spending on social services.  Future research should consider 
this.  Some corrections spending includes strategies that are considered more 
rehabilitative, such as substance abuse and mental health management; case management; 
effective transitions back to the community; and court, pretrial and other diversion 
programs.  There might be some spending in corrections within each locality that invests 
in more rehabilitative strategies that we cannot parse out with this data.    
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 Future research should also disaggregate the variables of social spending, 
education and public safety to determine if individual components have an effect on the 
property and violent crime rates.  Differentiating between the types of social services, 
education and public safety spending can create a clearer picture regarding which 
components have a relationship with crime, which do not, and which are strongest.  
Future research should also include longitudinal data for localities to inspect changes in 
spending and any subsequent changes in crime rates over time.   
 In addition, it would be beneficial for future research to explore possible 
nonlinearities in the data.  For example, the proportion of public safety expenditures 
aggregated at the state level may have an inverse effect on crime up to a point, and then it 
declines.  The current thesis did not address possible nonlinearities in the data, but future 
research should explore these possibilities. 
 Future research should also include additional components of social services, such 
as substance abuse and mental health programming, both of which have evidence- based 
programming that has been found to reduce recidivism.  Connections to social services 
should also be measured. A locality may spend a large proportion of the budget on social 
services, specifically, for instance, substance abuse services, but the systems may not be 
set up to optimize connections to those services.  Waiting lists might be long, the public 
or people expected to make some of the connections, such as probation officers, might 
not be aware of all of the treatment options available, etc.  So while measuring the 
amount of money invested in social services is worthwhile, also noting the infrastructure 
that is responsible for actually making sure that people make connections to those 
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services should be included in future research.  After all, if nobody is accessing available 
resources, will the amount of money invested in those resources really matter? 
 By accounting for different funding streams, concentrating on the local level 
spending, disaggregating the current variables, and adding variables that measure 
additional components of social services, education and public safety, a more complete 
study can take place to gain a better sense of the effects of local investments on property 
and violent crime rates.  The current study lends some potential insight into the possible 
relationships between some proportions of local spending aggregated to the state level 





























% High School Graduates 1.0000 
       % Below Poverty -0.7591 1.0000 
      % Male ages 15-19 0.1720 0.1039 1.0000 
     Violent Crime Rate 2007 -0.3851 0.3856 -0.3280 1.0000 
    Property Crime Rate 2007 -0.3675 0.4315 -0.1007 0.6869 1.0000 
   Violent Crime Rate 2008 -0.3720 0.3698 -0.3479 0.9955 0.6631 1.0000 
  Property Crime Rate 2008 -0.4281 0.4656 -0.1798 0.7320 0.9736 0.7167 1.0000 
 Violent Crime Rate 2009 -0.3681 0.3717 -0.3391 0.9911 0.6554 0.9966 0.7040 
 Property Crime Rate 2009 -0.4286 0.4891 -0.1092 0.7099 0.9677 0.6979 0.9811 
 Violent Crime Rate 2010 -0.3245 0.3592 -0.3291 0.9759 0.6057 0.9864 0.6541 
 Property Crime Rate 2010 -0.4004 0.5008 -0.1092 0.7187 0.9536 0.7079 0.9728 
 Proportion Education -0.0463 -0.0414 0.1293 -0.3416 -0.4857 -0.3353 -0.3842 
 Proportion Social Services -0.1379 0.3229 -0.1004 0.4463 0.2790 0.4443 0.2867 
 Proportion Public Safety -0.1506 -0.0861 -0.2627 0.1487 0.2679 0.1358 0.2308 
 % NonWhite -0.3670 0.1889 -0.3363 0.5991 0.5638 0.6031 0.5382 
 


























Violent Crime Rate 2009 1.0000 
       Property Crime Rate 2009 0.6904 1.0000 
      Violent Crime Rate 2010 0.9922 0.6426 1.0000 
     Property Crime Rate 2010 0.6968 0.9857 0.6558 1.0000 
    Proportion Education -0.3295 -0.3902 -0.3227 -0.3848 1.0000 
   Proportion Social Services 0.4328 0.2680 0.4260 0.2987 -0.4349 1.0000 
  Proportion Public Safety 0.1382 0.2168 0.1215 0.1792 -0.3551 -0.1227 1.0000 
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